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The military air cargo system was analyzed and compared
to the growing civilian air cargo intermodal container
system. Parameters such as cost, terminal handling, pack-
aging and aircraft compatibility were examined.
The research was conducted to look at the challenges
faced "by the Military Airlift Command (MAC) during periods
of military conflict and to examine possible solutions to
this dilemma through containerization.
The report concludes that the ^SjL Materials Handling
System will continue to be used by MAC in the short run,
and that this may sub-optimize the military air cargo
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Aerial Port of Debarkation (APOD) . An air base where
heavy transports arrive from channel destinations or
theater locations.
Aerial Port of Embarkation (APOE) . An air base where
heavy transports depart for channel destinations or theater
locations.
Air Line of Communication (ALOC) . The supply by air of
forces, equipment and supplies. A total air line of commun-
ication could extend from the Continental United States to
the forward edge of the battle area in an overseas theater.
Thus, the ALOC includes both strategic and tactical airlift.
Airlift . MAC provides three basic types of cargo
airlift, i.e., channel, special assignment and attached
airlift.
1. Channel Airlift — Regularly scheduled airlift
service by MAC has been established between points where the
volume of movement of non-availability of other forms of
transport require airlift. Frequency of service is dictated
by volume; however, a minimum of semi-weekly service is
normally maintained.
2. S-pecial Assignment Airlift - MAC provides
airlift service between points not within the established
channel airlift pattern or where airlift service is not
otherwise available for the movement of material, generally
in plane load lots.
9

3. Attached Airlift -- Attached airlift is the
airlift provided to a military organization or command by
MAC and attached to that organization or command for oper-
ational control. When aircraft are designated to provide
attached airlift, operational control will be as mutually
agreed upon by the Air Force and the commander concerned.
Allowable Cabin Load (ACL) . The available payload or
capacity of a specific aircraft after adjustments have been
made for mission profile, crew and fuel weight.
Bulk Cargo . Cargo that cannot be accommodated by the
conveyor system, but will fit on a U'6% pallet and can
therefore be processed inside the terminal building.
Cargo . Includes all items of supplies, materials,
stores, baggage or equipment which are classified and
transported as freight in contrast to those items which are
classified and transported incidental to passenger movement.
Continental United States (CONUS) . The ^8 contiguous
states and the District of Columbia.
Conveyor Cargo . Cargo that can be processed on the
conveyor system inside the terminal building.
Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) . The fleet consists of
commercial aircraft operated by the civilian airlines and
contractually committed to supplement the military airlift
requirements as required.
Intransit Cargo . Cargo received via aircraft for




Intransit Time . The elapsed time from time of entry
into, until the time of exit from, the MAC airlift system.
Manifest (Cargo) . A detailed listing by type of all
cargo loaded in any one conveyance.
Material Handling Equipment (MHE) . Vehicular and non-
vehicular equipment used for the movement of cargo.
Materials Handling System - ^63L . An integrated
materials handling system which is used to accomplish the
air logistics and aerial delivery mission. The system
consists of five separate subsystems, all of which are
interdependent. These subsystems are: aircraft cargo
loading, cargo ground handling equipment, air freight
terminals, intransit control and freight preparation.
Military Airlift Command (MAC) . The major Air Force
command, and Single Manager Operating Agency, for airlift
service under the Department of Defense. MAC'S mission
objectives are to train, equip and operate global airlift
forces to insure optimum mobility and flexibility;
participate in joint exercises and airborne training with
the ground, naval and air forces for which the Air Force
furnishes airlift support, to operate bases and worldwide
air routes of communications; and to maintain a global air-
lift command and control system which is compatible with
the overall U.S. Air Force Command and Control System to
insure optimum employment of airlift forces.
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Military Standard Transportation and Movement Procedures
(MILS TAMP)
. The uniform and standard transportation data
documentation and control procedure applicable to all cargo
movements in the Department of Defense transportation system.
Originating (Outbound) Cargo . Material that originates
on base from local vendors and other government installations
in the surrounding area and is delivered to the terminal by
surface shipment.
Outsize Cargo . Cargo which is too large or too heavy
to fit any existing or contemplated consolidation module
from the military airlift system.
Oversize Cargo . Cargo exceeding the size and weight
limitations of a single k6jL master pallet (108" in length;
88" in width; 96" in height; 10,000 pounds).
Permanent Air Terminal . An installation provided with
permanent facilities (brick and mortar) for loading and
unloading and the intransit handling of traffic (passengers,
cargo, mail) which includes receiving, palletizing and
processing functions.
Terminating Cargo . Cargo received by aircraft that
terminates on base or is redistributed by surface shipment.
Traffic Management . The direction, control and
supervision of all functions incident to the effective and
economical procurement and use of airlift service.
Tons--per-day ( T/D
)
. The total air cargo workload in
tons processed in an Air Freight Terminal in one day. This
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There is increasing pressure, as United States troops
and materiaJ. withdraw from overseas "bases around the world,
to have available on short notice, a system to provide for
a rapid movement of cargo and personnel to remote points of
operation. This system includes the Military Airlift
Command (MAC), the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) and their
associated personnel, equipment, and agencies which would
provide immediate airlift in time of conflict or potential
conflict. Specifically, MAC and CRAF have been tasked with
providing military cargo airlift on short notice around the
world, with major emphasis being placed on support of NATO
countries.
In comparing these two separate but related agencies,
with respect to cargo handling, several points are pertinent:
1. The military system relies heavily on pallets.
2. The civilian system relies to a greater extent on
containers.
3. There is a lack of compatibility between military
handling equipment and civilian handling equipment.
4. There is a lack of compatibility between military
aircraft and civilian aircraft.
5. There is little collaboration between the military




6. The two different systems have different goals
(readiness vs. profit).
7. The two systems are funded primarily through
different sources (MAC through taxes, GRAF through revenues
with some subsidy).
8. The public sentiment towards these separate groups,
civilian air cargo carriers and the military, is quite
different.
9. The needs of the two groups during peacetime are
different, while during conflict they are identical.
These points are not all inclusive, but they demonstrate
the^ divergence that exists between these two communities
of military air freight carriers.
A specific piece of equipment that has grown substantially
in use is the container. It emerged as a basic transportation
medium some 20-25 years ago in the land-sea environment and
has grown into an integral part of the rail-truck-sea
intermodal transportation network. Only in this decade has
the air container come into its own, but it highlights the
direction towards which all civilian cargo handlers are
proceeding; towards a fully intermodal transportation network
utilizing containers of standard sizes to effect rapid move-
ment of cargo. Unlike the civilian air cargo industry, the
military air cargo network still relies heavily on pallet-




Given the recent large increases in air cargo shipments,
the necessity for the military to rely on GRAF for a major
portion of military air cargo movement, the mandate to have
high input-output efficiency in cargo movement, rapid air-
craft turnaround time, and the need to efficiently utilize
aircraft space, the military must investigate all avenues
available to maximize the efficiency of the military air
cargo effort. It is postulated in this thesis that containers,
of standardized sizes, have possible economies and efficiencies
that should be examined. In light of the trend in the
civilian community to shift toward higher container use,
containers appear to be the transportation vehicle the
military air cargo system needs to realize maximum effective-
ness in air cargo movement.
16

II. BACKGROUND AND DEFINITION
Historians have recorded that aviation was commercialized
not for passengers, but for cargo; and that cargo was
specifically the United States mail. This commercialization
was done in a rather haphazard manner.
On the other hand, containers appear to have been well
thought out, with profit and reduced costs in mind. Sea-
Land Service made the fiirst purchase of surface-type
containers in 195^ in the amount of 1000 units, and this
container development has evolved into a staggering commercial
business. Today, there are over 2,000,000 containers in
service, being operated under many different corporate
names, both owned and leased, and the growth rate continues
to be massive [ll].
VJith the ever increasing amount of cargo being shipped
by air, it was axiomatic that containers would be used.
Containers have been used in the air cargo industry since
the late Fifties; however, containerization, as it is
thought of today, did not come to the fore until the advent
of wide-bodied jet aircraft. These large commercial jets,
such as the Boeing 7^7 » Douglas DC-10, Lockheed L-1011 and
Airbus A-3OO, have brought with them the ability to ship
large amounts of cargo in their belly holds utilizing unit
load devices (ULD) , and if freighter configured, have the
ability to carry unprecendented amounts of cargo in the main
17

cabin. The 7^7 can carry more cargo than any other
commercial aircraft, and is the only commercial aircraft
that can accommodate two standard size containers side by
side. These new aircraft brought about the design, testing,
evaluation and purchase in March of 1977 of the first air-
type intermodal containers. Most of these containers are
2.^4x 2.^^x6.00 meters (8'x8'x20') in size and are suitable
to be handled in any current container handling facility.
At the beginning of 1979 more than 500 air intermodal
containers were available for use. The growth in this
container market, although new, has been dynamic to say the
least [11].
The military, unlike the commercial air carriers, already
has a substantial performance proven air cargo handling
system, the ^SjL material handling system. This system is
an integrated logistics network of aircraft, pallets, and
material handling equipment that is fully compatible within
the military air cargo arena. The system has been in
operation since the mid-fifties. However, this system is
not fully compatible with containerized cargo facilities
in use by many commercial cargo aircraft. The container
and pallet can be accommodated by either commercial or
military aircraft, but changes must be made in handling
procedures and securing methods, when they are carried in
the different types of aircraft. These changes necessarily
mean additional time for load and offload operations.
Furthermore, the military has only a limited ability to
18

handle containers, and if container use continues to grow
at its present rate, the military could find itself dealing
with a serious logistics problem when an attempt is made to
employ GRAF aircraft.
These two material handling systems, one based on
containers and the other based on pallets, have evolved
under two separate and distinct infrastructures. There
are positive and negative points with regard to each system,
but an overriding positive factor about containers is
growth. If the growth in container usage continues, the
military will not be able to reach its full potential as a
high volume air cargo carrier, if the dominant ^63L cargo
system continues to be employed. The container must be
analyzed by the military not as a separate entity, but as
an integral part of the overall military logistics system.
This study, to a limited extent, is intended to draw
conclusions concerning the feasibility of an all military




III. INTENT AND PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
The intent of this project was to analyze the new intermodal
container, the Military Van (MILVAN), and the ^1-631 pallet-
ization system. Consideration of the intermodal container
and the MILVAN has been limited to the standard 2.^^x2.^'^x6
meter configuration, which is most prevalent. These tv/o
containers were compared with the current ^631 palletization
system.






6. Off-aire raft movement
7. Commonality
These items are not all of the parameters that could be
investigated; rather, they represent a list of topics that
bear heavily on the feasibility of using containers in the
military air cargo network.
The problem, actually, is self-evident. The Department
of Defense (DOD) does not have the ability to move cargo
and personnel to a forward deployed site via airlift in a
timely manner. This is true whether containers are used or
not, and is restricted by the fact that not enough organic
20

aircraft plus CRAF aircraft are available to move the massive
amounts of cargo needed on short notice f22:27]. This
problem is aggravated by the fact that the military is placing
more reliance on CRAF in case of an emergency, and CRAF
airlines are using more and more containers. Even though
CRAF operators modify their aircraft to comply with projected
government needs, their expertise in using containers is
rising due to greater use, and will decline with pallets as
pallets become used less frequently. This is the heart
of the problem facing military air lift. Two separate
entities that are supposedly working in harmony to meet
peacetime needs and projected wartime needs are actually
operating two distinct and separate logistics handling
systems.
Further, it appears that if these two systems were
used together, they would not be able to satisfy the require-
ment for massive and rapid movement of cargo.
The problem, therefore, can be summarized by stating
that there is a lack of military airlift capability in time
of war, and the question to be answered is: What can be
done to either provide the required airlift or make more
efficient use of present and projected airlift capability,
given some budgetary constraints?
Research attempting to answer this question was
conducted utilizing various sources, listed as references
and in the bibliography, and consisted generally of:
21

1) Naval Postgraduate School sources
2) Defense Logistics Studies Information Exchange sources
3) Trade Journals
^) Civilian container and air cargo corporations
5) Phone conversations with knowledgeable people in
the field both in the military and civilian sector
6) Visit with the Navy Liaison Officer at Travis Air
Force Base, Calif.
The analysis was conducted under several assumptions:
1) Civilian container use will increase, and pallet use
will decrease, causing a shift in handling knowledge and
expertise.
2) Containers are new and have room for improvement,
while pallets have reached their state of maturity.
3) Civilian air freight firms will continue to increase
their wide-body aircraft inventory, and decrease their
outdated narrow-body aircraft inventory.
^) Surface modes have little bearing on the military
air cargo transportation problem.




IV. PRESENT CIVILIAN CONTAINER USE
The present number of air intermodal containers stands
at approximately 500, compared with the 2,000,000 containers
used in surface operations. The growth of both types of
containers has been impressive, and is expected to continue.
These container numbers are based on an expression in the
industry called 'Twenty foot equivalent units (TEU's)."
Containers come in various shapes and sizes; however, they
are totaled based on the twenty foot container. This
standard is used due to the large number of twenty foot
units.
Containers are used in the air industry to ship
practically any item. What is evident in the air industry
is the proliferation of different types of containers.
The types of containers are lower deck (LD), non-standard
unit load devices (ULD), standard ULD's and igloos, which
are configured to the interior of aircraft fuselages.
The use of many different types of containers is on
the one hand efficient, because they utilize the most amount
of space, while on the other hand they create handling
problems because of the diversity of containers with their
various stuffing requirements and differing shapes. This
specialization in different types of igloos and containers
started with the advent of jets, and has become worse, with
the introduction of wide-bodied jets and their associated




Appendix A pictures and describes twenty and forty foot
containers that are available for lease through Container
Transport International (CTI). Note that all of the
containers shown, with the exception of those in Appendix
A-9 and A-10
,
are of steel construction intended for surface
movement. These containers are of heavy construction,
stackable six high, and fully compatible with all transport-
ation modes except air. They can, however, be used in the
air modes if the carrier and shipper are willing to pay an
excess tare weight penalty.
The air- type intermodal container shown in Appendix A-9
and A-10 is quite different. It is much lighter, permitting
a substantial reduction in gross weight. This is due to the
types of materials (balsa wood, styrofoam, plywood, and
aluminum) that are used in its construction. The air
container is stackable only two high. The air containers,
presently 2.^^x2.^4x3m and 2.^^x2.^^x6m, designated by the
airlines as M-1 and M-2 respectively, are the only containers
available for fully air intermodal container shipment.
Both types of containers, the conventional surface and
the air intermodal, have the same general size and shape,
and can be maneuvered into aircraft. The large differences
occur when tare weight and gross weight are compared. The
air container has a tare weight rating about half of the
steel container, and the comer post rating creates a severe
restriction on the air/land containers cargo capacity.
2^-

Seaboard World Airlines has a somewhat different
container as shown in Appendix A-11. This container, of
lighter weight, is not liftable by conventional handling
equipment, because it was produced before the present air
container standards were approved. This container is still
used by Seaboard, but requires some special loading
equipment.
The diversity in air container sizes is presented in
Table I so the reader may fully comprehend the differing
types of unit load devices (ULD) available to air carriers.
The issue is further confused by Table II. This listing
illustrates strictly lower deck (LD) units that add further
to the large number of different types of containers
utilized by the commercial carriers.
TABLE I
NATIONAL AEROSPACE STANDARD(NAS ) 36IO BASIC ULD SIZES
SIZE AIRLI^rE


























Source: Cargo Logistics Airlift Systems Study, Volume 1,




SPECIFICATIONS OF SEVERAL LOWER DECK AIRCRAFT CONTAINERS




LD-3A 120 2890 lbs.
LD-5 233 6200 lbs.
LD-7 358 10000 lbs.
LD-9 370 10200 lbs.
LD-11 2^0 6400 lbs.
LDL/LDN 90 2500 lbs.

















This plethora of air containers has been presented to
highlight the problems the air cargo industry faces. The
industry on the one hand espouses intermodalism, which
implies some sort of commonality among carriers, and on the
other hand it generates and receives approval of divergent
breeds of containers tailored to specific types of aircraft.
This tendency must be recognized even though the thrust of
this paper is towards the utilization of intermodal types of
containers.
B. EMPLOYMENT AND UTILIZATION
What may appear to be a severe problem to the airlines
and shippers is in fact a boom that parallels containerization
growth in the surface transportation community during the
1950 's.
What is attracting shippers, forwarders and the airlines
themselves to air containerization in increasing numbers?
For the airlines, there is a reduction in terminal handling
and documentation cost. Storage facility problems are
minimized. Delays in loading have been arrested. Retrieval
time has been shortened. For the shipper, packaging costs
are reduced, while greater protection against pilferage and
26

damage is afforded goods, thereby providing a basis for
lower insurance costs. And of course, there is the
advantage of transit speed inherent in the mode. Shippers
are also giving an affirmative nod to air containerization
because of incentive programs that have developed in past
years [2: 12 J.
The emergence of wide-bodied jets, coupled with the
inherent benefits of containerization in general, brought
about the fully intermodal container that provides for
rapid movement of goods. Exhibit 1 depicts succinctly the
growth of air intermodal containers. These graphs also
display the tendency of late to gravitate towards leasing
companies for the suppliers of containers. This leasing
arrangement has become very popular because the airlines
do not have to make a capital investment, and it provides
for a greater degree of cooperation between modes (the
lessor acting as an intermediary).
The intermediary function is not to be neglected, for
there have been problems in intermodal cooperation.
In spite of the advantages of intermodal cargo transportation
,
progress in bringing an integrated surface-air transportation
service into being has been slow. The lengthy time required
to develop through bills of lading and through rates is a
good example. One of the basic reasons for this is that
when multiple modes are involved the modes must work
cooperatively to insure that the interests of all are
preserved. This coordination may involve many complex
factors such as involvement of different labor unions,
diverse regulatory agencies, and various hidden costs.
External factors always exist... [17«1].
The problem of integrating the surface-air modes of
shipment recently received a positive "shot in the arm"
through air deregulation. The proponents of intermodal
transportation see deregulation as providing 1) the






























































































































generate new air cargo demand through reduced rates, and
2) cooperation between all shippers due to less regulation.
As of yet this has not been demonstrated.
The use of intermodal containers today, though increasing
at a rapid pace as more Boeing 7^7 freighters are acquired,
is at best infrequent. Table III presents percentage
information on ULD usage for the year 1976 as compiled by
McDonnell Douglas Corporation under contract to the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA).
TABLE III








refer to Table I and II
The percentage totals 100 percent due to the nature of
the interrogation method used and does not include ULD's
which have erratic use, half -width pallets, or special
pallets. These findings do bear out the fact that 72
percent of all-freight flights were made by narrow-body
jets, not capable of handling the Ml or M2 container [^:^08j.
It is assumed that these percentages have shifted since then
due to the acquisition of approximately fifteen more B7^7F's




The cost effectiveness of a container, whether for
surface or air, is possibly the most problematic of all
containerization concepts. It is problematic because even
with the greater efficiency afforded by the container, the
container is quite expensive.
The container itself, due to light weight requirements
for air travel (materials such as balsa, fiberboard and
styrofoam are used) and the structural strength requirements
that have been set by the International Standards Organ-
ization (ISO) (materials such as corrugated or reinforced
aluminum are used to sandwich the lighter products), has
costs approaching $9,000 (see Exhibit 3) each for a six
meter container. The difficulty is convincing the airlines
to buy these more expensive containers, when an argument
can be made to purchase cheaper surface containers which
cost approximately $2,500 each for the same size container.
Since surface container total costs are lower, it is
logical to use them. However, the added weight of the con-
tainer (^500 pounds for a surface container in comparison
to 2200 pounds for an air container)
,
plus the additional
requirement to use a 1400 pound flat pallet on the surface
container because air container bottoms must be flat,
severely hampers maximum utilization of aircraft space and
weight. This is not cost effective, either on a total
distribution cost basis or single trip basis [l9s9l'
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Exhibit 3 depicts a representative air intermodal
container which cost $8500. When this container is compared
to a typical 6 meter and 12 meter surface containers (as
shown in Table IV)
, a trade-off must be made to lower total
distribution costs before decisions can be made about new
air container acquisitions.
TABLE IV
RELATIVE COSTS OF CONTAINERS
TYPE AVERAGE COST
6 meter intermodal (air) $8500
6 meter surface $2600
12 meter surface $4100
Source: 6 meter and 12 meter surface prices obtained
from Director of Public Relations, Container
Transport International (CTI), and represents
industry averages, May 1979*
Considering the much larger capital investment (over 32
times) in air intermodal containers and a nearly one-half
reduction in allowable cargo weight (22885 pounds as compared
"to 39550 pounds) per container, the cost of air intermodal
containers, when viewed alone, seems prohibitive.
However, when costs such as handling, pilferage, damage,
inventory loss and the like are considered these costs offset
one another, when compared to the total investment. Another
cost item is the material handling equipment (MHE). Each
airline that handles intermodal containers has a need for
^100,000 loaders and other auxiliary equipment. Since at
least two are required at each air terminal, insuring a

















































high ^19: 9]. At present the airlines do not consolidate
their needs with joint usage of MHE. They purchase their
own equipment, therefore necessitating higher rates for an
adequate return on their investment.
There are presently several surface container firms
(such as CTI) that have an inventory of six meter air
intermodal containers. With this type of commonality
present today, growth can occur at a rapid rate. The total
number of containers is small in comparison to the surface
modes, but expansion has been excellent. The airlines, due
to capital considerations, have also discarded the notion
that they must own the containers, rather than lease them.
The pooling of containers through leasing corporations
has demonstrated to the airlines that reduction in costs
can be achieved when large numbers are involved. If the
leasing corporation can purchase more air intermodal con-
tainers due to high demand by airlines, leasing rates can be
reduced, and the airlines could in turn pass on lower shipping
rates. This concept is an excellent example of minimization
of costs through the use of an integrated system. An
integrated system, one agreed to by all carriers as in the
surface mode, would reduce redundancy of effort and dupli-
cation of investments. The pooling of containers is but a
small part of the airlines overall effort to eliminate
duplication and reduce costs. These are of course problems
that must be dealt with due to the small amount of freight
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carried by air, but fortunately, these problems are beginning
to be analyzed on a systems level, with an eye towards an
integrated solution.
Maintenance costs on intermodal containers at the
present time appear illusive. The reasons are:
1. Most airlines do their own maintenance and do not
keep close control on hours spent in this activity.
2. Surface-type container repair facilities know that
air containers cost roughly 3-5 times that of sea containers,
so repair rates are scaled accordingly.
3. A total loss (no salvage available) figure does not
exist, but is accepted as $5^00.
^. The economics of container repair is not fully
understood for intermodal types. [[20:12j
These problems are beginning to be corrected as more
airlines turn over their repair work to outside facilities.
As these facilities become more knowledgeable in air con-
tainer repair,' it is reasonable to conclude that they will
better understand the techniques involved, and be able to
obtain a more accurate estimate of costs.
There is another topic deserving of mention, since it
is possibly the largest controlling influence on cargo
operations, and that is total cost. It should be noted in
Table V that indirect operating costs are quite large in
comparison to direct operating costs. The surface modes of
transportation are more able to control their indirect
operating costs, which necessarily result in lower shipping
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charges ri7!3j« Until these indirect operating costs can he
brought in line on a comparable scale with indirect operating
costs of surface carriers, the air cargo industry is going
to be hard pressed to compete on a volume basis with the
surface modes.
These total costs may be reduced by a cutback in cargo
handling and flying operation expenditures due to higher and
faster throughput, and less loss and pilferage of cargo by
using containers. These reduced costs would be offset by
increased capital investments and depreciation. A complete
feasibility study appears necessary to determine the trade-
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D. AIRCRAFT COMPATIBILITY AND TRENDS
The Ml and M2 intermodal containers are compatible only
with wide-body jets. The Boeing 7^-7? is the only aircraft
capable of handling 2.4^x2.4^ meter containers two abreast.
The Douglas DC-10, Lockheed L-1011 and Airbus A300 can
handle one lane of 2.^^x2.^^ meter containers with the
remaining space being taken up by pallets. The wide-body
jets are also capable of handling surface containers, as
well as pallets. Though surface containers must be attached
to a l^i-OO pound adapter pallet for aircraft loading, this does
not prevent nose loading of B7^7F's due to the additional
height. However, the extra 1400 pounds for the pallet and
the 5*250 pounds in container tare weight obviously reduces
the amount of cargo carried, and therefore a high priority
must be placed on surface container shipment by air to
justify the additional cost.
Aircraft such as the Boeing 707 and Douglas DC-8 are
widely used as cargo aircraft. Neither of these is capable
of handling 2.^^x2.4^ meter type containers, but both are
capable of carrying smaller containers, igloos, and pallets.
The vast majority of these smaller aircraft, and their
associated compatible containers and pallets, is one of the
main reasons that container growth has not proceeded at a
faster rate.
However, cargo carriers are opting for wide-body jets
(especially the Boeing 7^7F) as new purchases when their
older 707 's and DC-8's reach the end of their useful lives.
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and this trend is influencing the increased need for more
intermodal containers. This fact is born out by Exhibit
4. In the past six years the number of B747F's has
increased from one to sixty-five, and the carriers who own
these aircraft have attempted to only handle unitized
containerized cargo at all times. To do otherwise with a
large aircraft would keep the plane on the ground longer and,
thereby, insure inefficient use.
Basically, 2.^4x2.44 meter type intermodal containers
are most effective with wide-body jets, and as more of these
jets are purchased with a resulting decrease in the narrow-
body jet population, there will be an even greater demand
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V. PRESENT MILITARY CONTAINER USAGE
Containerization in the military arena should he
prefaced with a discussion of military containerization
policy. The Department of Defense (DOD) has repeated
strongly its advocacy of containerization.
1. Military cargo will he containerized for trans-
portation whenever possible.
2. DOD will rely primarily on container resources/
services furnished by the commercial transportation
industry.
3. Development of a container-oriented logistics system
is a matter of priority DOD wide. [15:15]
It should be noted that regardless of DOD policy, the
military is basically container barren, and relies almost
solely on the 4-6 3L materials handling system for air cargo
movement.
A. U-SJL MTSRIALS HANDLING SYSTEM
The i4-63L system consists of the basic unit, a 2.7^x2.23
meter pallet made of aluminum and balsa wood in a sandwich
type construction, and webbed restraint nets. These pallets
have restraint lips designed to be compatible with the guide
rails and restraint mechanisms installed in military aircraft
such as the C-1^1 and C-5A [25:1]. This aircraft intemal
restraint system consists of roller conveyors, external
^1

guides, locking rails and many tie down rings. The function
of the system is to help guide the pallets into the aircraft,
and then secure the pallet in the desired position. The
C-I30 can accommodate five 463L pallets; however, this
aircraft is not configured with the 463L internal handling
or restraint system, and is more time consuming to load.
The C-141 can accommodate up to ten pallets, and the C-5A
can accommodate up to thirty-six pallets in two rows [l^O,
9,24J. The ^63L system is completed by the ground handling
equipment. This equipment consists mainly of 25.000 pound
and ^0,000 pound loaders as shown in Appendix B-1 and B-2,
^,000 pound forklifts (which replace the ^,000 pound trucks)
as shown in Appendix B-3» staging rollerized equipment, and
their associated warehouses. This handling equipment, which
is located at all major Air Force bases, is an Air Force
controlled system since the Air Force is the single manager
for all military cargo airlift.
There are some problems associated with this system,
even though it still functions well. The 25K and ^OK loaders
are beginning to show their age through increased maintenance
requirements. Further, although a ^OK loader with its five
pallet limit is useful for loading a C-1^1 with a ten pallet
maximum, it is inefficient in that it takes an unreasonable
amount of time to load a C-5A with a thirty-six pallet
capacity. Changes in loading equipment and or procedures
are needed for the C-5A assuming the Air Force retains the
^6jL system. The amount of manpower that must be expended
k2

to load and unload aircraft is excessive. Further, this
manpower would not be available in a crisis situation due
to recent cutbacks by Air Force bases, which have already
resulted in backlogs of cargo R-S].
The ^63L system is also basically an Aerial Port of
Entry (APOE) to Aerial Port of Departure (APOD) operation.
The system was designed for break-bulk input to the ware-
house for pallet buildup, shipment, and break-bulk teardown
at the destination. This is inefficient because of the
large amounts of time needed to handle packages individually.
The closer the break-bulk operation gets to the consignor and
the consignee, the more efficient the operation becomes.
This problem has been addressed through a joint Air Force -
Army program called Air Lines of Communications (ALOC).
The Army (shipper) builds pallets at its shipping points,
and delivers the pallets to the Air Force. The Air Force
loads, transports and unloads the complete pallets at the
APOD, and the Army picks up the pallets for tiransfer to
their final destinations. This program is not "intermodal"
,
but is a consignor to consignee operation which is
necessary to make containers viable, or for that matter,
make the military air cargo system viable. As far as the
Air Force is concerned, these pallets are containers since
the Air Force serves only as the carrier of this unitized
load, and does not keep track of individual pieces. Initial
indications were that this joint program greatly reduced
shipping time, mainly due to the elimination of break-bulk
handling at the APOE and APOD.
^3

It is imperative at this point to maJce some comparisons
of the kSjL system and containers. Exhibit 5 shows the
basic flow involved in loading an aircraft with these
































This exhibit assists the reader in understanding the
basic facets of the process used at Travis Air Force Base,
which is representative of all Air Force bases. In this
process, if material enters military cargo jurisdiction in
containers, extra work is required to break down the
containers for palletization. This process itself creates
duplication of effort. The organizing for palletizing and
the palletizing process itself creates additional work,
and further slows down the processing of the material. From
this point, however, the process is relatively efficient,
for pallets are handled as units. They are retrieved from
the palletizing area, moved to the aircraft and loaded.
I^^r

The loading process is efficient, with the exception (see
page 42) of the C-5A, in that the decks of all aircraft
(C-130, C-l^l and C-5A) have rollers, and the pallets can
easily be moved into place by two men and secured.
It has conclusively been demonstrated in the sea-cargo
movement arena that containerization, in-and-of-itself
,
reduces costs.
This switch to containerized cargo resulted in increased
capital costs for equipment, new ships and loaders, and
therefore, increased interest and depreciation costs.
Overall, it is estimated that investment approximately
doubled; however, the reduced manpower resulted in an
overall savings of 10 percent. In port, time decreased
considerably from 7 days for a break-bulk ship to 22 hours
for an equivalent containership. Other indirect costs
included a reduction by 50 percent of breakage through
containerization. Pilferage is negligible via containers
compared to an average 10 to 15 percent loss via con-
ventional mode. The lower loss rates can be attributed to
a reduction in handling of 2 to 8 times compared to break-
bulk shipments, depending on the origin and destination
of the containers [25: 6].
Some of the points mentioned above highlight the military
dilemma, even though it describes the conclusions reached
about sea containers in 1958. The government airlift system
presently experiences a similar pilferage and breaking
rate [l8]. A larger labor force is required to accomplish
the break-bulk process, as well as organizing the material
for palletizing and the palletizing itself. It has already
been mentioned that the necessary labor force is not available.
Further, the breakdown of containerized materials is an
additional step in the material handling process, a step
that adds to the probability of pilferage or breakage.
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In addition, the problems experienced by the commercial
shipping companies of increased wages and the necessity to
reduce total costs to remain competitive impinge directly
on the military air cargo shipment process. Within the
last ten years, military and government employee wages in
general have drastically increased in relation to total
outlays, creating a large direct labor cost in handling
material.
It appears reasonable to assume that if the front end of
this material handling process, from receipt to palletization,
is allowed to continue, the military will continue to spend
excessive amounts of money and time handling break-bulk
shipments, contending with pilferage and breakage, and
providing less than desirable service. An attempt has been
made to alleviate some of these problems with ALOC , but ALOC
constitutes only a small part of Air Force cargo movement.
These problems will be further compounded if civilian con-
tainer growth matches projections. If it does, the military
will have to contend with an ever-increasing number of
containers to be broken-down for palletization. More import-
antly, providing less than required service may equate to
loosing a battle, if not a war.
However, one must closely compare the benefits gained by
container unitizing loads against the system of the 463L
paJ-let. It appears that the cost would be prohibitive to
scrap the 463L system for a container system. The Air Force
presently operates C-130's, C-l^l's and C-5A's all configured
i^6

to handle the ^63L pallet, and these pallets can be loaded
quickly, with the exception of the C-5A. The cost alone
to 'hack-fit" these aircraft to accommodate containers
appears prohibitive.
It must also be considered that the military airlift
of cargo accounts for only about five percent of total
military cargo movements. This further enhances the argument
that the present system should be maintained, using container-
ized movement secondarily in air shipment. It is also true
that present 463L pallet handling equipment is incompatible
with intermodal containers, or MILVANS , and any military
container program of reasonable dimension would necessitate
the acquisition of different handling equipment. Appendix C
shows an adapter pallet for use with surface type containers.
This has been the military's method of addressing the con-
tainer interface, but it does not address the lightweight
intermodal container.
At this juncture, there is an impasse. However,
several other concepts must still be considered, namely,
packing density, total system efficiency and military goals.
The packing density of a ^63! pallet is good, but the
space the pallet takes up in the aircraft is generally small.
There are massive amounts of unused and available cargo
carrying volume. The ^6jL system has better volume and load
factors when used with the C-I30 and C-1^1 aircraft, but
these factors are not optimal by any means.
^7

The 463L system, though considered relatively efficient
by many, appears to be showing its weaknesses. In comparison
to container traffic, it lends itself to higher pilferage
and breakage, as previously mentioned, and limits the ability
of a commander at a remote outpost to receive shipments of
materials in a timely fashion. It is mentioned here in regard
to immediate delivery at the beginning of a conflict, for
j
certainly, massive amounts of material to support a war effort
would be transported by sea or land.
Further, in case of a major conflict, wide-body commercial
j
jet liners would be summoned to help in material movement.
The interface problems would be compounded by relatively
overall inefficiencies of the pallet system in comparison to
the ever growing intermodal container market in commercial air
cargo shipment. A conflict is certainly not the time to begin
1 attempting standardization.
As a concluding remark about the 463L pallet, a close look
must be taken at the goal of the system, and how it relates to
the goals of the military defense force. The aircraft and
pallet system operate under the premise of providing air base
point to point delivery and air drop services. With the
supplier to customer intermodal service now available commercial
wide, should not the military strive toward the same goal?
It is feasible, but is it cost effective? These questions
will be considered after a full discussion and comparison
of the container question has been undertaken, and a




B. CIVIL RESERVE AIR FLEET
The Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) cannot be fully
understood without a knowledge of the total strength of U.S.
cargo air lift capacity, both civilian and military. Therefore,
a digression is needed to compare military and civilian
assets.
The Military Airlift Command (MAC) has a large number of
aircraft at its disposal for military cargo airlift. Such
aircraft as the G-9, C-I35 and C-I37, as well as smaller
trainers and helicopters are included in its inventory.
The Air Force Reserve also has older aircraft such as the
C-I23 and C-7 that can be activated in fairly short order.
The Naval Air Reserve has a number of C-ll8's that can be
activated rapidly. However, the bulk of MAC air cargo
capacity consists of the G-I30, C-1^1 and C-5A, inventory
quantities of which are shown in Table VI.
TABLE VI
AIRCRAFT QUANTITY AS OF MAXIMUM PAYLOAD RANGE AT MAX. PAY-
TYPS 1 JAN 1979 TONS LOAD NAUTICAL MILES
C-130 311 22 2^20
c-iii-i 270 ^^^.5 3500
C-5A 76 132.5 2950
Sources: Defense Transportation Journal, Volume 35 t Number 1,
Feb. 1979, p. ^6. Payload and range information:
Janes' All the Worlds' Aircraft, 1978-1979-
Z4.9

These three aircraft provide a total lift capacity of
about 29.000 tons, at maximum range. Of course, longer
ranges can be achieved with these aircraft if cargo loads
are decreased, or maximum payload carried can be increased
if inflight refueling is provided for extended ranges.
These figures give estimated single trip airlift capabilities
only, and the total single trip military lift capability is
approximate]y 50,000 tons when all military cargo aircraft
are used. These figures indicate that these three aircraft
are the workhorses of the military airlift community.
The Air Force is continuing the C-5A wing modification at
a cost of over $1 billion. This program is absolutely
necessary to sustain the ability of MAC to perform its
mission, since the C-5A represents about 50 percent of its
military airlift capability. This wing modification is being
done to correct design problems found in the wing attachment
to the fuselage. The C-1^1 is scheduled to be "stretched" to
provide a 30 percent increase in cargo capacity. This pro-
gram is expected to cost about $600 million and will increase
cargo single-trip payload for the fleet of C-l^^l's by about
3,600 tons, or 13,35 tons/aircraft. All indications point
to the fact that iVLAC will need every bit of capacity it can
obtain [i6jII-B-83. For comparison, Table VII presents
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Source: Defense Transportation Journal, Volume 35 » Number
1, Feb. 1979, p. ^6.
This massive reserve airlift capability has been growing
for the last 25 years, and when first conceived, was to
augment the strategic lift capacity of MAC. CRAF has today
become an equal member, so to speak, providing half of the
USAF's long-range capability during contingencies. However,
even with this massive airlift potential, studies continue
to indicate it is not sufficient, mainly due to outsize
cargo such as the M-60 tank [16:11-3-6 J.
CRAF is presently in a transitional period. Various
member airlines of CRAF such as Seaboard World, Flying
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Tiger, United, Pan American and American have agreed to
purchase aircraft in cargo modified configurations (the
programs are referred to as full-mod and mini-mod) that will
provide the best overall capability in time of need. The
purchases are being partially offset by the government to
encourage the airlines to participate in CMF. This program
is generally known as the GRAF Enhancement Program, and is
designed to produce either pure cargo or convertible aircraft
that meet the needs of MAC if required [22:5o].
This program has drawn to it these carriers that are
international carriers or at least long-haul carriers, and those
that were scheduling wide-body purchases regardless of GRAF.
For the carriers already planning to operate air cargo
freighters, the GRAF Enhancement Program has acted as a
subsidy for their equipment acquisition costs.
This program has projected conversion costs of $570
million in 1978 dollars [22: 55l« However, it should be noted
that at the same time the federal government is, 1) providing
consent and approval of air cargo systems, albeit modified
to meet military needs, that are structured around a growing
container influence, and 2) is supporting a military air cargo
system that is basically incompatible with the civilian
systems. That is, GRAF is at the zenith of available tech-
nology, utilizing the most current techniques in cargo
handling and dispatching, while MAG is still using equipment
that was conceptualized in the late ^O's and put into action
in the late 50' s*
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Considering the fact that;
1) CRAF operators are in business for profit.
2) Profit making organizations do not undertake ventures
unless a reasonable risk is present, and a reasonable return
on their investment is likely.
3) Profit making organizations use new technology to
attract a larger share of the market population.
4) Profit making organizations either provide the
service advertised, or no longer exist.
It is only reasonable that MAC, and DOD as well as
Congress, should not be looking towards a temporary fix of a
1950 's cargo handling system within MAC but should rather be
looking at the possibility, whatever the cost, of becoming
compatible with CRAF commercial -type operations. The "patch-
ing" of an outdated system, with its inherent cost savings,
may spell disaster when compatibility and mission effectiveness
are subservient to various costing techniques that sub-
optimize the military air logistics network.
C. PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS
The military, unlike the civilian community, has only a
small number of containers. This is a result of the usage of
the 463L system for air cargo, and the lack of containership
usage for surface cargo. A small number of random-size con-
tainers is included in the military inventory, but these are
not controlled or used in the same manner as commercial
containers. These small containers resemble igloos or LD's,

but they are not a pre-planned, integrated unit of an overall
logistics system.
Military Vans (MILVANS) are the only containers in the
military inventory that have been procured as an integral part
of the military logistics network. There are two basic types
of MILVANS. The basic form of the MILVAI^I is a 2.^^x2.^^x6
meter box, of good strength and of similar construction to
the commercial surface container. Appendix D-1 shows an
interior view of a MILVAN with pertinent data listed. A
modification has been made to this basic container for
transport of ammunition. An interior view and pertinent data
are presented for this modification in Appendix D-2; note
that the basic difference between the two containers is an
additional I3OO pounds of tare weight due to the ammunition
restraint system. The other form of the MILVAN is the refri-
gerated type. This container is shown in Appendix D-3, and
is basically the same construction, but with added weight
for a generator and ancillary equipment to perform the
refrigeration function.
As of this writing, there were 65IO MILVANS of the
conventional and ammunition handling type in the inventory.
There has been no plan to procure additional regular MILVANS,
but a procurement of over 5000 ammunition restraint containers
is planned in the 1983-198^ time frame [8:1-1, 1-57- The
refrigerated MILVAN is only now coming into the military
inventory, with initial acquisition having begun in February
of 1979 and having a projected delivery of fifty units in
1979. Total acquisition is planned for 9^8 units ^8:I-6j.
5^

D. EMPLOYMENT AND UTILIZATION
The MILYAN is generally used for shipment of small
piece cargo and ammunition. Though an adapter pallet is
available to make the MILVAN compatible with the military
air mode, it is seldom used because of the weight penalty
involved. What follows is an analysis of the MILVAN as it
relates to the air mode.
it is obvious that the MILVAN was not designed for air
use, because of its high weight. The fact that it is
extremely inefficient when used for air cargo handling is
summarized in Exhibit 6 for loading operations.
EXHIBIT 6



























Assuming a MILVAN or comparable 2.^i4.x2.^^x6 meter
commercial container is the input, two severe inefficiencies
become readily apparent. The placement of the container on
an adapter to interface with the ^SjL compatible aircraft
system is time consuming, and adds an extra 1^00 pounds of
unwanted weight. The adapter is absolutely necessary with
MILVANS to provide a flat bottom surface, and to prevent
comer point overload of deck area in the aircraft as
presented by the bottom comers of MILVANS r25:3^3*
Another problem inherent in the air use of MILVANS is
the capacity of current loading equipment. With a ^4,800
pound gross weight of MILVANS, the predominance of ^0,000
(40K) pound and 25.000(25K) pound loaders makes it apparent
that not all equipment can handle the MILVAN. There is some
movement to acquire more container handling equipment;
however, this procurement is proceeding at a slow pace and
could not keep up with CRAF aircraft if employed for massive
cargo movement in a crisis. None of the present military
handling equipment, for example, is able to achieve the 16-18
foot deck height required to load a Boeing 7^7? L25:19j.
This problem will be reduced when the equipment shown in
Appendix E-1, S-2, E-3 and E-^ are acquired, but as indicated,
these are considered long-lead time procurements.
The present method of loading containers in military
aircraft, in and of itself, wastes time. Container line-up
with the aircraft does not always happen on the first
attempt. This is due to current methods, which require
exact match-up of the load to the aircraft rail system.
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and will be corrected with the acquisition of the new
handling equipment.
Time is also wasted in securing cargo. Since military
aircraft are configured for ease in securing the 463L pallet,
changes must be made to properly secure a container. Again,
more time is required. Naturally, these steps require
additional people, and with the ever-increasing wage costs,
in relation to total government outlays, occurring for
military and civilian government employees, these costs are
escalating.
It is also apparent that existing military aircraft
which was designed to accommodate the ^63L pallet, incur
large expenditures in time, money and lost military
effectiveness when used to transport containers. It also
appears that movement is afoot to design different types of
containers, which have no relationship to the containers on
the commercial market. An example of this is illustrated in
Appendix E-5f a container insert, which is basically not
compatible with anything available except the MILVAN.
The intermodal container, unlike the ^63L pallet and
MILVAN, has an extremely short history, but it is already
part of the civilian air distribution network.
Exhibit 7 is presented for comparison with the flow


















It should be evident that this system is somewhat less
cumbersome. The flow process is extremely simplified, with
no necessity to attach adapter pallets. The high efficiency
at the load site is realized due to containerization at the
point of origination.
Assuming the necessity is eliminated to manually rearrange
deck runners, massive amounts of wasted labor hours, time,
and ancilliary equipment are eliminated. The material is
packaged once at the origination point, and unpacked at the
receiving point. This process flow eliminates the repackaging
inherent in pallets, and eliminates the need for adapter
pallets associated with the MILVAN.
Furthermore, the intermodal container is fully intermodal.
It can be accommodated by air-sea- truck or rail vehicles, and
it is standardized and meets international requirements, as
well as being in inventory (or on lease) and in use by major
commercial cargo carriers. The container comes in lengths of
10' and 20'; and for the 20' container, it has a weight nearly
2000 pounds less than a MILVAN. This reduced weight makes
it extremely efficient for air use.
58

The intermodal container, of course, has all the advantages
of the MILVAN relating to packing density, cubic utilization,
pilferage and breakage. It also has a superior ability to
withstand corrosion due to its non-ferrous materials. Over-
all, this unit is far superior to the ^-SjL pallet or MILVAN
to effect fast, reliable and quality transportation services,
and cannot be matched in weight advantage. It is in pro-
duction, most technological difficulties have been corrected, and is
fully compatible with all occidental modes of shipment,
as well as most international carrier cargo systems.
There appears to be some reluctance at the military
planning level to come to grips with intermodal ism, and the
need for compatibility with the commercial air cargo
industry. Perhaps this conclusion is too hasty; however,
the military tends toward a "redesign of the wheel"
approach rather than a productive use of good, current
technology being utilized by profit oriented corporations.
Not to appear too pessimistic, it must be noted that
the military air cargo community has at least realized the
obvious efficiencies in containerization. The MILVAN
realizes higher stuffing efficiencies, particularly the 6
meter container, and even when an adapter pallet is used,
has a somewhat comparable load efficiency with that of the
^63L pallet. The container provides the advantages of less




The extra time required to prepare the interior deck
area of military aircraft and to place an adapter on a
container is shorter than the time required to break down a
container, sort and palletize its cargo.
The military appears to be moving in the right
direction, but the direction is necessarily controlled and
limited by available funds. Therefore, it is imperative that
the funds be used wisely. With the burgeoning use of inter-
modal containers on the commercial scene, it does not appear
that resources are being best utilized for efficient manage-
ment of air cargo transport. This statement can be justified
because of the following facts:
1) In case of a conflict, extreme problems would be
encountered in using commercial aircraft for military use.
2) A joint service plan is not available for the
replacement of older J^IHS with newer MHE for the movement of
pallets, as well as containers.
3) A concerted effort is not evident to provide policy
concerning direction of the military container effort as it
relates to compatibility with the civilian container
community.
^) Time wastage and military effectiveness are not
given due regard when analyzing trade-offs between pallet-
ization and containerization, but languishes in World War II
concepts of break-bulk cargo.
5) Analysis has traditionally been done piecemeal
(Air Force separately, Navy separately, et cetera), rather
than as an overall systems analysis for DOD.
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These problems necessarily result in a small use of
containers for military air cargo movement. The military
forces have not made a concerted effort to use MILVANS for
air cargo, and have made little progress, if any, towards
the use of commercial air intermodal containers. An apt
quote is made here about sealift, which also is directly
relatable to airlift.
Containerization is now a way of life and we must learn how
to live with it and obtain the most from it. We must learn
to benefit from the advantages offered by the container, to
outweigh , if you will, the problems. We cannot utilize
containers for our peace time sealift requirements and ex-
pect to revert to a break-bulk operation in a contingency,
nor can we cling to break-bulk methods now, hoping we won't
need to use containers in an emergency. We as planners must
adjust our thinking to the container and revise our planning
factors accordingly... The policy decision to use commercial
containers for most DOD shipments has already been made,
[refering to sealift] It is more appropriate to utilize this
existing civilian commercial capability than to procure our
own. We have many other uses for the available funding
[lO:ir-N-5, II-N-ll].
S. COSTS
Cost data, as they relate to military hardware, are
probably some of the most difficult items to "pin-down"
when describing material that has been in the inventory for
an extended time. Therefore, some of the cost inforTnation
presented here is a "best guess" by those considered
knowledgeable in the field.
The MILYAN is estimated to have a unit replacement cost
of $5300, and generally exceeds sea-land container prices
on a ratio of 2:1 due to military specifications (MILSPECS)
[22]. It is interesting to note that inflation has taken
its toll here, as in all other facets of life. The general
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cargo MILVAN's were procured in June 1970 at a unit cost of
$1225 [8:1-5]. These figures indicate an inflation rate
for MILVAN's of about 17.7 percent/year.
The MILVAI'I configured for ammunition restraint costs
about 20 percent more than a conventional MILVAN due to
the increased tare weight. Presently, ^32^ MILVAN
ammunition restraint containers are in inventory, with
procurement scheduled for 5097 additional units in fiscal
years 83-84 [8:I-l]. This information, coupled with the
above cost data, can be used to generate an estimated cost
for this procurement.
$5300 + 20f.(55300) = $6360 per unit
17.7^ inflation rate/year
Projected unit cost( ( (6360x1.177)1.77)1.77)1.77 $12,205.71
total procurement=($12,205.71)(5097)= $62,212,503.87
Considering that this really is a small procurement when
comparison is made with the procurements made by commercial
leasing corporations (refer to Exhibit 1), the military is
most likely paying premium prices for small orders rather
than obtaining low unit costs due to quantity. Furthermore,
the military must buy their units here in the United States,
while commercial firms are buying or manufacturing their
containers overseas where prices are lower.
The refrigerated MILVAN cannot be compared to other
MILVAN's due to its special use. The planned unit cost of
the container, generator and refrigeration unit is $18,000.
The container is of modified commercial design with a
MILSPEC. With an authorized procurement of 9^8 units at
a later time, total procurement costs are estimated to be
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?Sl7,06^,000 in 1979 dollars [8:1-6]. Some negotiations are
still in progress for outyear procurement, which is expected
to drive up the cost by an unknown amount based on the
inflation rate.
Maintenance data were not obtained by the writer on any
of the MILVAPI's. This information may exist, but it could not
be found in any of the reference publications cited, or
through phone conversations with military logisticians.
Turning now to military material handling equipment, a
look at the equipment in inventory, and then of projected
procurements is required. The basic equipments in inventory
are the 10,000 pound (lOK) forklift, the 25,000 pound ( 25K)
and the ^0,000 pound (^OK) K loaders. The lOK forklift has
a unit replacement cost of $32,8^8, while the 25K and ^OK
loaders cost ^12^,000 and $162,300, respectively [3].
Considering a minimum of thirty major Air Force bases both
inside the Continental U.S. (CONUS) and outside (OUTUS), a
minimum inventory estimate can be made of $9»57^f^^O for
one unit at each base. However, all of the major bases have
at least two units each, and the larger bases, such as Travis,
Dover, Hickam, Ramstein, Wright-Patterson, et cetera, have
four units each. This at least doubles the population at
all bases, and quadrouples the population at one-third of
all bases. Using this information, an inventory value of
approximately $31,91^,800 can be computed. This estimate
should be considered low because these figures do not
reflect equipment at small Air Force bases.
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Making a comparison with the handling equipment
scheduled for procurement reveals some interesting facts.
The equipment scheduled for procurement, or that which has
already been partially procured, is equipment designed to
handle both pallets and containers. This provides
additional justification to support the need to replace
aging equipment (though this is not a one-for-one replacement
program) and to be capable of handling containers and the
attendant commercial wide-body GRAF aircraft. Some of this
new equipment consists of a ^,000 pound (^K) forklift
(Appendix B-3) , a scissor type loader (Appendix E-1) and a
hydraulic type elevator loader (Appendix E-^). The equipment
is being procured as shown in the appendices, and does not
include Appendix E-2 and E-3 due to inability of obtaining
costs. Procurement plans are as follows:
^K: procure 833 units @ $10,120 ea. $8,^^29,960
scissor loader: procure 2^ units
^ o255»000 ea. $6,120,000
elevator loader: procure 32 units
i> $185,000 ea. $5.920.000
$20,469,960 [3j
This procurement plan surely demonstrates the military
commitment to handle civilian containers moved by
commercial wide-body jets, but does not directly address
the incompatibility of military air cargo containerization
with that in the civilian sector. Though a $20 million
expenditure sounds large, this procurement program does not
reflect serious thought to wartime contingencies, since
more equipment would be necessaryat large bases such as
6ii

Travis if a conflict erupted. In addition to the foregoing,
2520 adapter pallets shown in Appendix C are also scheduled
to be purchased. The total procurement of 2520 units will
cost $5,292,000, and this program also appears austere [23:37!.
Since an inventory of approximately 6,500 MILVANS exists,
it is reasonable to assume that enough pallets should be
available to handle all MILVANS. This does not assume all
MILVANS would be airlifted; rather, it provides a possible
indicator of how many containers, both military and civilian,
might be airlifted in a contingency. Also, since 5.000
more ammunition configured MILVANS are scheduled to be
procured, it would seem appropriate to have the capability
of airlifting a high percentage of these units, not counting
the civilian container requirements.
Lastly, these procurement programs appear to emphasize
two separate concepts. One, a pallet to interface MILVANS
and sea- type containers with military aircraft and, two,
equipment to handle containers and provide the capability
to load and offload CRA? aircraft at military air bases.
Little emphasis is placed on the handling of inteirmodal
containers in the military system. Rather, the intermodal
container is viewed as a civilian product, one for which the
military must buy handling equipment to support, and the
adapter pallets are viewed as military equipment necessary
to integrate surface-type (or MILVAN) containers into the
46 3L material handling system. It appears that two separate
and distinct systems are being generated for military cargo
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airlift. The two systems are obviously cost effective,
but they do not have the ability to interface (trans-
shipment, rapid load-unload rates and military-CRAF cargo
exchange rates are paramount to the combined system
effectiveness) with each other.
The remedy of purchasing loaders, adapter pallets, and
forklifts has evolved because these costs are much smaller
than military aircraft modification costs ["21:159]. This
handling equipment would have to be purchased regardless of
what decisions were made to modify military cargo aircraft.
Those opposing aircraft modification make the argument that
the cost of the modifications would be prohibitive, as well
as not needed, since the CRAF aircraft can handle the con-
tainer traffic. However, it can also be argued that the
relatively low cost programs that have been developed may
seriously jeopardize the effectiveness of the overall military
air logistics system in times of high volume demand, such as
a war.
F. AIRCRAFT COMPATIBILITY AND TRENDS
The compatibility of containers (MILVAI^IS or commercial
types) is a matter of well known complacency since there has
not been much written addressing the compatibility of
containers within the military air cargo system.
The basic problem resides in size differences, with attendant
difficulties in the securing mechanisms involved. The ^631
pallet is 2.7^ m. wide by 2.23 m. long, with the wide
dimension being placed in the width of the aircraft. This
indicates that, if desired, a 6 meter container could be
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placed on three pallets (length 2. 23in.x3=6. 69m. ) with an
additional .69 meter to spare. However, it is readily apparent
that conducting this sort of operation would leave much to
be desired.
This procedure would waste .69 meter of space per every
three pallets, and all of the aircraft could not cube out,
due to the .69 meters wasted per three pallets, with con-
tainers alone; there would have to be pallets mixed with
container shipments. Further, although the process of
strapping containers to pallets is quite time consuming,
until the adapter pallet shown in Appendix C is in inventory,
containers must be strapped to ^63L pallet trains. As
mentioned previously, this adapter pallet is only configured
to adapt the ISO container (not the air intermodal) to the
463L aircraft roller system, adds a weight penalty, and,
though not as time consuming as strapping containers to
pallets, also wastes time.
VJhat is apparent in this analysis is that only the ^63L
pallet is compatible with military cargo aircraft. The
implication here is that while the commercial industry is
working to standardize containers and handling equipment on
an international basis, the military is working on temporary
solutions to a massive logistics problem, that of non-
compatibility with civilian commercial aircraft. As the
military continues to think "adapter", the military logistics
network becomes further separated from the civilian air cargo
industry, and continues to design temporary fixes to alleviate
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aircraft non-compatibility with containers. As air- type
intermodal containers grow in usage, this gap will surely
widen.
One other problem of major proportion exists in the area
of compatibility. The M-60 and the soon to be obtained XM-l
tank can only be airlifted by the C-5A. This impacts on
other airlift requirements, since, if large numbers of
tanks are to be airlifted, other military and civilian
aircraft will be needed to airlift the bulk of the non-
outsized cargo. This would place a further strain on any
system that cannot provide rapid turnaround time. A major
dependence would fall on CRAF, and, at the present or near
future, it is doubtful that the military could satisfactorily
handle a deluge of B-7^7f"s with containers. Again, it
appears the military is faced with several independent systems
that are not tied together in a concerted effort to maximize




VI. ANALYSIS OF PRESENT CONTAINER USAGE
An attempt at comparing container usage within the
civilian and military sectors can be likened to trying to
add apples and oranges. The two logistics systems are quite
different, operating from a completely different frame of
reference. However, a comparison will be attempted to shed
light on the interface problems that exist.
A. SIMILAR CONTAINER USAGE
Military and civilian container systems are similar in
some of the following respects:
1) The MILVAN and its civilian 6 meter counterpart are
almost identical, with the MILVAN being slightly stronger
due to MILSPECS.
2) The refrigerated MILVAN is basically a commercial
design with slight modification.
3) Projected procurement of container material handling
systems are the same.
^) When DC -10 aircraft are used by the Air Force for
cargo or personnel, LD units are used for baggage on a
lease basis.
Though this listing may not be all inclusive, these are
the only points of commonality that merit reflection or




B. DISSIMILAR CONTAINER USAGE
Military and civilian container systems are different
in the following respects:
1) The ammunition MILVAN is much stronger than its
civilian counterpart due to the nature of its purpose.
2) Container inserts are at the design and testing level
in the military. No consideration is being given to an insert
program by the civilian sector.
3) The civilian community is striving to achieve
commonality, while the military is planning on keeping the
iJ'63L system in operation.
^') The civilian sector is stepping up air container
use, and the military is not.
5) The civilian sector containerizes about 80 percent
of its air cargo; the military containerizes less than 5
percent of its air cargo.
6) Civilian container stuffing procedures and
capabilities are being refined in the air mode, and are
essentially non-existent in the military.
7) The civilian sector stresses intermodalism as a
concept to be implemented; the military is attempting a
"patch"' of an existing system.
C. ANALYSIS
There are strong indications that the civilian community
is containerizing at a reasonable pace, with the objective of
building an intermodal system that will reduce costs, increase
70

shipment speed, reduce aircraft ground time, give greater
customer satisfaction and, of course, be profitable.
The military on the other hand is relying on the ^63L
Materials Handling System which was designed for break:-bulk
operation. It has been shown in numerous civilian studies
that break-bulk operations when employed with large volume
cargo operations lose money, require massive amounts of
manpower, and inordinate amounts of time. It has also been
shown in numerous studies that the massive outlays necessary
to convert to container operations are offset by reduced
handling costs, reduced insurance claims due to breakage
and pilferage, and reduced labor costs. Containerization
provides a perfect example of transitioning from a labor-
intensive to a capital-intensive operation, as labor costs
rise relative to capital costs.
The military has only scratched the surface with the
joint Air Force-Army ALOC program. This small program has
reduced ALOC shipment holding times at terminals from about
five days to one day, due to the unitized handling of
material from consignor to consignee. Until the military
changes its concepts about large-scale air cargo operations,
and becomes standardized with the civilian community, the
armed services will continue to deliver air cargo late, to
have high breakage and pilferage rates, to be a labor-
intensive operation with not enough cheap labor available,
and to not have the capability to truly interface with CRA?
on a large scale.
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In the past, the ^63L system has been considered too
"entrenched" to be phased out of the military air cargo
system, and also that it would not be cost-effective to
replace the 463L system with another. It is the author's
contention that, thou^ costly, if the ^SjL system is not
replaced by a civilian compatible air cargo system that
relies on unit loads such as the container, and replaced
soon, the military air logistics network will be unable to
provide the necessary support to the armed services due to
low throughput, slow interagency transfer, lack of compati-
bility with a system that makes up 50 percent of our
intercontinental airlift capacity, labor intensive operations
that are presently undermanned, and lack of handling equipment
There are more reasons that could be cited, but these are
considered to be the most severe. Cost admittedly must be
given due consideration, but cost minimization at the expense
of support effectiveness can only lead to disaster.
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VII. PROJECTED CIVILIAN CONTAINER USAGE
Predicting the number of containers that will be in use
in the future is as tenuous as predicting the number of
nuclear power plants that will be operating in twenty years.
The corollary is that, until the Three Mile Island nuclear
disaster, there may have been resistance by some to nuclear
power; but, since the disaster, political, economic,
socialogical , medical and heretofore unknown factors have
created a climate that is not receptive to nuclear power.
The same can be said of containers. There are various
factors that impact on air cargo, and containers specifically,
that could alter any set of projections. However, the
projections made here are based on analyses already conducted
by McDonnell-Douglas and NASA. It is assumed that these two
groups can predict with reasonable accuracy based on valid
assumptions and current trends.
A. PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS
If one looks at exhibit 8 and 9 on the following pages,
certain physical facts become evident.
In the Douglas Aircraft Company Cargo Logistics Airlift
Systems Study (CLASS) , Volume 3, the models and equations used
show that a theoretical maximum cube utilization for a
container of 90 percent exists. This is due to the fact
that a container will "weigh out' before it 'cubes out'.
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reached with the 6 meter and 12 meter container. Further,
both figures indicate that the other containers that are
widely used are close to this theoretical maximum. This
would indicate that the physical dimensions of containers
will stay relatively the same. This assumption is enhanced
by the fact that all outyear projections presently available
indicate the 3 meter, 6 meter and 12 meter containers as
being the prime types of containers for intermodal shipments.
It is further anticipated that the LQ units shown,
which are the most commonly used, will continue to be used
with the possible exception of the DC-8 belly container.
This observation is reasonable since the vast majority of
belly containers were designed and are an integral part of
the wide-body jet aircraft.
In the mainstream, the intermodal container demand v/ill
be constrained by the types of aircraft in service and the
volume of cargo carried. In today's air cargo market, some
unknown limit exists on the number of M-1 or M-2 containers
needed due to the types of air cargo handled. As long as
air cargo consists primarily of perishable high value and
emergency cargo, the intermodal air cargo concept is not
justified flrll??. However, if the major air cargo carriers
continue to develop intermodality , market the concept and
achieve volume shipments of cargo, the container, specifically
the cube efficient IVI-2, should become an important part of




In today's environment of converting passenger aircraft
to cargo use, the container for air cargo is somewhat of a
by-product. Even though all of the wide-body jets can
accommodate the M-1 or M-2 intermodal container and several
civilian derivatives of military cargo aircraft can also
accommodate containers, the B?^?? is the only commercial
aircraft that can handle large numbers of intermodal con-
tainers, and the only one that can accommodate two lanes of
containers.
Although present wide-body aircraft are compatible with
containers, and vice versa, the present situation does not
fully exhaust container possibilities. This is due to the
fact that commercial aircraft are designed to carry people,
not cargo. This has led to several studies concerning air-
craft designed for the cargo function. These studies have
resulted in projected aircraft in the 1990 time frame to be
three and four lane 'container-in-fuselage type aircraft,
as well as three and four lane 'container-in-wing" spanloader
type aircraft. In these cases, the aircraft have been designed
assuming the M-1 or M-2 container as the primary shipping
medium. These types of assumptions seem valid since other
transportation mediums revolve around the 6 meter container,
so it would appear reasonable they will not alter their
massive investment.
Based on the foregoing, it is reasonable to predict that
intermodal containers will become more prevalent, will con-
tinue to be compatible with present wide-body aircraft, and
will be compatible with projected future generations of cargo
77

dedicated aircraft. There are certain problems, however,
about the future of these projected aircraft that will be
addressed below.
It is also apparent that as larger numbers of wide-body
aircraft enter the commercial cargo fleets, the problem of
non-compatibility will be reduced, and, hence, compatibility
will increase. By introduction of wide-body jets, not only
is main cargo hold compatibility increased, but lower deck
compatibility is increased also, due to commonality amongst
the LD units used in wide-body aircraft.
C. ECONOMICS
One must remember that above all, no matter how grandiose
the scheme, if money cannot be made, the scheme will probably
not come to fruition. Airlines are now flying passengers at
lower fares, with higher densities, resulting in larger
profits. The same can be inferred in the air cargo field.
The relevance of the analogy, of course, is due to economics
of scale, and until there are sufficient numbers of lower-
priced containers to yield lower shipping costs to the
consumer, the air cargo industry will continue to hold less
than one percent of the domestic cargo market, and probably
will continue to lose money in the air cargo business r7:55j
Complicated formulas and sophisticated analytical
techniques are missing from the above discussion because they
are simply not available, since the airline industry, when
analyzing air cargo, does not have a solid data base.
Until a good data base can be generated, sufficiently
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sophisticated models will not be available to make
accurate predictions on the strategies required to achieve
more rapid growth [_6:32j.
This point was driven home quite explicitly by E. H.
Boullioun, President of Boeing, at the Ninth International
Forum for Air Cargo held at Vancouver in September of 1978.
In my view, the airframe manufacturers should not at
this time gamble on speculative programs for air cargo.
Airline top and middle managers--especially at the
combination carriers--have not done enough homework on
cargo. Their major problem is not equipment but
marketing ri3s66j.
Mr. Boullioun continued by saying that airlines must
get a more accurate fix on freight costs and profitability,
on how much of the currently available space is being
efficiently marketed, on what products constitute air
eligible freight and on techniques necessary to capture
some of the present freight that is being moved by surface
modes.
Air containers may follow the same history as surface
containers, unless someone takes a hard look at what steps
need to be accomplished to obtain healthy growth with
sufficient profit.
V^at is meant here is the following: Surface containers
presently are profitable; however, during their growth
stage, the surface container industry experienced some of
the same growing pains the air container is experiencing
today. The air cargo industry is not making use of the
surface container industry's experience to the fullest.
Certainly, growth of the air container can occur only with
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an aircraft that is designed to carry cargo, not an aircraft
designed to carry people that has been converted to carry
cargo. However, referring again to Mr. Boullioun of Boeing,
When our industry starts to really understand the cargo
market and its economics, then, and only then, I can see
Boeing prepared to furnish a new technology freight
airplane £13:66].
Douglas Aircraft supported this statement, as did Lockheed,
and all three were in agreement that new technology freighters
are not in sight until the mid 1990 's or later. This
attitude "by aircraft manufacturers could be a stumbling
block to rapid growth in container usage, but there are
viable alternatives.
There is the possibility of converting Douglas DC-8's
and Boeing 707 's to cargo use. However, the demand for
aircraft to carry passengers, a surely profitable venture,
is choking off the supply of available aircraft for con-
version. Further, these aircraft are not compatible with
air-type intermodal containers.
Another possibility, as proposed by Lockheed, is the
conversion of military freighters such as the C-I30, C-141
and C-5A to handle intermodal containers.
Lockheed has a candidate for this role in the L-IOO-50
derivative of the Hercules civil /military transport, and
Crmsby (Lockheed's President) said that airlines have
shown considerable interest in the proposal... Depending
on the configuration, the Dash 50 could carry payloads
of up to 72,000 pounds and could accomodate up to ten
ten foot (6 meter) containers [13567^.
These proposals, of course, are holding actions until
the new technology aircraft come on the scene to provide
more efficient movement of containers. However, it is
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maintained by several airlines that this holding action will
greatly facilitate more rapid growth of the air container
market, and therefore air cargo.
These general remarks can be further amplified through
the presentation of several cogent points and the following
illustrations. In Exhibit 10, on the following page, the
cost chart shows the dramatic increase in costs plotted
against cents/revenue ton mile during the 197^-75 time frame.
The reader should realize that this cost increase was mostly
due to the Oil Embargo and the resultant increase in fuel
prices. In 1979 the world is again experiencing dramatic
increases in oil prices, which will increase the cost of jet
fuel. Jet fuel is one of the prime ingredients needed on a
continuing basis for large scale air cargo movement, and,
if this cargo movement is hindered, the resulting small
shipments would essentially stalemate growth of air
containers.
Exhibits llA and IIB on the following page highlight
further possible problems that are economically equivalent
to a type of 'domino theory'. If the Russellville concept
is correct. Exhibit llA reveals that advanced-designed
air freighters are indeed cost effective and competitive
with trucks, and may even be competitive with rail shipments.
This is predicated, however, on a growing economy that
demands more and more long haul, high value, rapid movement
of cargo. During a period of slow growth, or stagnation,
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additional containers, and, hence, no need for an advanced-
design freighter. This emphasizes the fact that the economic
principles of container usage demand large cargo volume.
Further, the problem is compounded when looking at
total distribution cost concepts in a stagnant market.
Inventory and warehousing costs as shown in Exhibit 113
on page 83 would increase in a stagnant market due to lack
of sales, and would prevent shippers from incurring the cost
premium paid for rapid shipment by air.
The foregoing illustrates that container development is
predicated on air cargo growth, and air cargo growth depends
on a healthy and growing economy. If one assumes growth
will continue as it has, the conclusion reached must be to
go forward with air container construction and use. This
leads to advanced-designed cargo aircraft, which will spur
even further development of air containers. However, if one
assumes poor growth, or a recession, container demand would
be minimal due to small demand for air cargo service.
Several points mentioned in the Douglas' CLASS report
deserve mention here, for they are extremely important in
analyzing future air cargo growth, and, hence, container
demand.
1) Pallet tare weight is considerably less than
containers.




3) The container is capable of generating more revenue
than pallets, given the container is fully utilized.
^) In the short-haul environment, the container is
considerably better.
5) In the long-haul environment, the pallet is
marginally cheaper.
6) Container acquisition costs and maintenance costs
are considerably more than pallets.
7) Handling equipment costs are about the same.
8) Pallet technology has been advanced to its limit,
while container technology is still improving. r5O^0j
The foregoing information tends to indicate that:
1) For massive growth and usage of containers , better
definition of markets will have to be obtained.
2) Containers are marginally better than pallets,
assuming a growing economy, in a wide range of uses.
3) Containers are considerably better than pallets,
assuming a growing economy, in a restricted range of uses.
^) Container trade-offs must be made against
efficiency, loss, pilferage, damage, insurance costs, and
greater tare weight.
5) Air containers should not be considered as
individual entities, but should be conceptualized as part
of an integrated logistics network.
6) Container growth and use will only occur as rapidly




VIII. PROJECTED MILITARY CONTAINER USAGE
To attempt to predict what use military containers will
have, the types of containers that will be available and the
compatibility that will exist is indeed difficult. However,
due to the long lead times involved in military procurement,
the future short-term hardware owned by the military
establishment can be more easily predicted than in the
civilian community.
A. PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS
In the near term, it is clear what types of containers
will be available in the military inventory. There is no
scheduled procurement of general purpose MILVANS or any
other type of general purpose container through ?Y I985.
Also, as previously mentioned, the only scheduled procurement
of containers consists of the ammunition MILVAN and refri-
gerated MILVANS. Schedules call for the procurement of
adapter pallet for MILVANS and new handling equipment, prim-
arily for use with intermodal containers carried on CRA?
aircraft. These procurements have all been mentioned
previously. At the present time, only the container inserts
are awaiting a procurement decision.
What this indicates is a military container inventory
of steel 2.^^m x 2.^^m x 6m units, in fairly small
quantities, and adapter pallets to allow for air shipment
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of these units. These containers will be moved primarily
"by surface modes, with air shipment resorted to during
emergencies. If the container inserts are approved for
procurement, they will provide a capability to achieve
smaller unit loads, while promoting a "box in a box"
concept that will further add to tare weights.
There are presently no indications that the military is
considering the purchase or lease of air intermodal containers.
This further supports the conclusion that the ^63L Material
Handling System will remain in effect for some time to come,
unless a radical and rapid change in packaging philosophy
is generated within DOD. Therefore, current projections
indicate that unitization will rely on MILVANS
,
possible
container inserts, and the ^63L pallet. The primary air
cargo shipment medium will be the pallet, while the MILVAN
will remain essentially an Army piece of equipment. The
ALOC system will expand, which in turn will result in a
higher degree of unitization within the military.
3. AIRCRAFT COMPATIBILITY
If one wishes to view MAC in isolation, it may be said
that on the grounds of compatibility the Air Force has
produced an efficient instrument of air cargo movement, 'r/hen
one expands the environment to include the civilian community,
a different conclusion may be reached.
The 46 3L pallet, as previously mentioned, is fully
compatible with all major MJ^C aircraft. This compatibility
is ex-oected to continue at least through the early 1990 's.
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since no major aircraft procurement is scheduled until
that time. The only procurement that is desired is the
so-called C-XX large cargo transport. The military sees a
need for this advanced all-cargo aircraft in the 1990 time
frame, with a desired military procurement of 60 units out of
a total 300 units. The balance, of course, would be pur-
chased by civilian airlines for joint use under GRAF
auspices. These figures assume many variables, the most
important of which are projected airlift needs around the
world, which are tenable at best. The base projection is that
the capability to airlift 370,000 tons to Europe in 30 days
is needed, and the Government Accounting Office (GAO) has
strongly critisized these figures Ll:26oJ.
The C-XX proposal is not even in the design stage; therefore,
one could postulate many theories as to its eventual compat-
ibility with the existing 463L system, or containers. Since
the program is proposed to be a joint civilian-military
purchase, and the civilian community would be acquiring the
majority of the aircraft, it would want these aircraft to
be container compatible. It seems apparent that the military,
given its dependence on GRAF during emergencies, will have
to work together with the GRAF airlines in the design and
acquisition of any projected air freighter.
Further, it is reasonable to assume that any joint air-
freighter venture would be dominated by the civilian
community in the area of cargo conveyances (pallets or
containers), and that the civilian airlines would refuse to
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make massive investments in a freighter configured only to
be compatible with the ^63L system. It is further hypothe-
sized that the military must look closely at container
systems for future aircraft acquisitions, and retrofit
present aircraft over several years, so the military is
compatible with the civilian community.
C. ECONOMICS
It is argued that the cost to replace the ^63L system
is prohibitive, and therefore replacement should not be
considered [25:23]. This philosophy is not necessarily
incorrect
, it is merely not supported by substantive
data. A long-range analysis has not been conducted to
determine if the massive container investment needed for
DOD (not each service independently, as has been done, but
for DOD as a whole) to replace the 463L system would be cost-
effective. Granted, the analysis of such a program would
be massive. However, the military is saying no to such a
replacement program on educated guesses, which may be valid,
and then, again, may be in error.
It is postulated that: considering the massive benefits
and increased profits accruing to the maritime container
industry, the obvious commitment by civilian air cargo
carriers to increasing containerization, and the fact that
these ventures would not have been undertaken without sound
economic judgement, the military must further analyze its
minimum commitment to containers. This is only reasonable
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since the military may be able to realize the same benefits
that the maritime industry has enjoyed.
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IX. ANALYSIS OF PROJECTED CONTAINER USAGE
An attempt will be made in this chapter to compare
container usage in the military with that in the civilian
community. The comparison will be made concerning the
projection of expected container or unitization acquisitions,
and their interface with aircraft.
A. PROJECTED SIMILAR CONTAINER USAGE
In the future, military and civilian container systems
are anticipated to be similar in the following respects:
1) The MILVAN will continue to be almost identical with
its 6 meter counterpart in the civilian surface mode.
2) The refrigerated MILVAN will be almost identical with
its 6 meter counterpart in the civilian surface mode.
3) Container handling equipment will be compatible with
air or surface containers, and will be of standard commercial
design.
k) As more DC-IO aircraft are used, a greater number of
LD units will be used for baggage.
5) ALOC , though not a container program, is a unitization
program for consignor to consignee transfer, and is similar
to the palletization in commercial use. ALOC shipments are
expected to increase.
These major points of commonality are expected to exist
through the next decade. These may well be the only points
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kof commonality well into the 1990 's, depending on yet
unscheduled procurements.
3. PROJECTED DISSIMILAR CONTAINER USAGE
Military and civilian container systems are anticipated
to be different in the following respects:
1) The ammunition MILVAN will continue to be structurally
different due to its unique requirements.
2) If container inserts are added to the military
inventory, there will be no parallel addition in the civilian
community.
3) With the '^63L system projected to remain in effect,
the material packaging systems (military vs. commercial) will
grow farther apart.
^) The ^63L system will also widen the military-civilian
gap in organic material handling capability, as the commercial
air cargo network tends tovjards intermodalism.
5) The civilian air cargo community is using air
intermodal containers, and increasing their use, while the
military has no plans to acquire or lease these units.
6) The percentage of civilian air cargo that is
containerized is expected to increase; the military expects
modest increases in ALOC shipments, with little or no
increase in container shipments.
7) Military stuffing procedures will tend to get better,
but will not approach the civilian sophistication.
8) The intermodal gap will widen, as no concerted effort




There are several facts concerning military/civilian
commonality in air cargo that are self-evident. Some are a
little more difficult to make apparent, but have been
mentioned previously in this report.
The civilian air freight community is deeply involved
in procurement of wide-body aircraft and container handling
equipment. Initial container growth was rapid, slacked off
temporarily, and then picked up again after the carriers had
mapped out their strategies. The air cargo carriers had to
containerize, as did the maritime and surface cargo industry,
so that they could offset the rapidly increasing costs of labor
with capital-intensive investments that could be depreciated.
The air cargo industry is at last doing in-depth economic
analyses for future air cargo markets, and is working with
other modes to change obstacles in the way of intermodality.
It must be kept in mind that all of the changes occuring now,
and those to come, are being implemented to achieve high
efficiency, reduce costs, and hopefully increase profits.
Unlike the civilian community, the military is relying
on a proven, yet obsolescent pallet system. The entrenched
^631 pallet system is seen as the military air cargo handling
system through the 1980 's and into the 1990 's. This system
could be considered satisfactory, if civilian container
usage projections were not so large. Further, the widening
gap between container and pallet usage would be of no
consequence if the military did not depend on the civilian
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air cargo system for strategic airlift. In the military
world of ten to fifteen year procurement lead times for
major equipment, it is necessary for the services to act
jointly with the civilian cargo community to produce a
common system. The course now being followed is leading the
military toward further air cargo handling isolation from
the rest of the air cargo community.
The magnitude of this separation can be more fully
illustrated through projections of cargo airlift in the
out-years. Figures presented to the DOD Joint Container
Steering Group in January of 1976 indicate a 2^00 twenty
foot equivalent unit (TEU) demand per day at New York's
J?K airport in 1985" This does not include projected belly
freight, and is a modest estimate based on past experience.
If this is projected to the year 2000 at a five percent
compound growth rate, the demand will increase to 5000 TEU '
s
per day at JFK. This reflects only one major airport in the
United States. Airports such as Chicago, Los Angeles,
San Francisco, Boston, Dallas-Ft. Worth and Atlanta would
have sm-aller demands, but large nonetheless ["12: 2j. This
kind of large volume demand, if realized, will place an
inordinate demand on break-bulk methods, but could be
reasonably managed through the use of containers.
Contrasting this kind of massive daily volume with
military projections is staggering. Based on May and June
1978 military air cargo flow to Europe and the Mediterranean,
a potential of 1592 TEU's per month exists. If one assumes
9i^

the same 5 percent compound growth, which may not be valid due
to the military's increasing use of commercial air cargo
service, the I985 Europe/Mediterranean demand will be 22^^-0
TEU's per month, or 7^.6? TEU's per day. At the same pro-
jected increase, the year 2000 demand would be ^657 TEU's per
month, or 155 TEU's per dayr9:26l. This kind of projected
demand is extremely small in comparison to the civilian
counterpart, and is unlikely to influence the civilian
community in their plans for advanced air cargo handling
systems. This exorbitant gap between sizes of systems v/ill
most definitely have a profound effect on the military, if
CRA? is called upon for logistics support.
The information presented above indicates that a
commonality gap exists between military and civilian air
cargo handling systems, and that this separation will most
likely widen in the future. This trend may be viewed as
positive or negative depending on one's perspective.
The present facts and projected trends substantiate the
growing rift between the two logistics systems, and indicate
that the military will be hard pressed to ship the massive
amounts of cargo needed in a rapidly escalating situation
due to break-bulk methods, insufficient manpower, and most
importantly, lack of compatibility with a 50 percent partner




A. THE INTERMODAL OUTLOOK
With the growing need for more transportation services
as our economy, as well as the international economy grows,
it is reasonable to conclude that civilian air cargo ship-
ments, and specifically intermodal shipments, will expand
at an increasing rate. It is also reasonable to conclude
that as the civilian air cargo industry obtains a firm data
base for conducting cost analyses, the ability will become
available to reduce and streamline indirect operating costs.
Furthermore, it is evident that the civilian air cargo
industry is at the threshold of instituting a full blown
intermodal air container program, one that has the potential
of becoming a part of a fully integrated intermodal container
network. It is only the cooperation and communication among
all modes {which may not be simple) that can bring a complete
intermodal network to fruition.
Along with the nev/ technology must go the necessary
logistics to ensure that, after transport, the shipment
reaches its final destination on schedule. It does little
good to have a fast and reliable means of transportation, if
the shipment sits at the terminal for extended periods after
arrival. This implies that a ground support network of
comparable sophistication is also needed.
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It has already been mentioned that the military has a
large investment in the ^631 pallet system. This system grew
out of different transportation requirements, before inter-
modality was introduced as a logistics concept. For the
Department of Defense to attempt to scrap this system would
necessarily meet extreme resistance at the congressional
level. The resistance, of course, would be in direct
proportion to the estimated costs of replacing the present
bulk shipment and pallet shipment modes. These costs would
be extremely high.
However, it miBb be appreciated that the present ^63L
material handling system is getting older, and needs
replacement; a topic that has been addressed. It appears
necessary that a cost analysis be done to determine if new
intermodal containers can be gradually phased into the
military logistics network. This could be done with the
MILVAN program remaining in effect, and the MILVANS could
continue to be used for surface shipment as well as
emergency air shipment. There is a need for this system, as
it would afford the logistics manager the ability to effect
rapid delivery of goods. This would provide the needed
interface with the commercial cargo carriers if their
services were required.
3. SUr/IMARY OF MAJOR POINTS
What follows is a list of major points concerning each
type of cargo system in a comparative manner. This listing
should not be construed as all inclusive, rather, as
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representative of the major advantages and disadvantages of
commercial air cargo handling in relation to military air
cargo handling.
^631 PALLET
1) Efficient load-unload cycle within DOD.
2) Inefficient load-unload cycle if used outside DOD.
3) Requires break-bulk of containers at terminal
necessitating longer hold times.
^) Requires sort and palletization of shipment.
5) Does not provide true direct supplier to customer
service.
6) Both military and civilian cargo handling equipment
can handle these pallets.
7) Has a good packing density, but is not cube effective
in aircraft.
8) System does not accept containers easily.
9) Material subject to pilferage and breakage.
MILVM
1) Inefficient load-unload cycle in DOD or in civil
market.
2) Exhibits extreme weight penalty.
3) Is not subject to significant pilferage or breakage
of material.
^) Has an efficient packing density.
5) Has a good cube utilization.




7) Provides for direct supplier to customer service.
8) Requires an adapter to be transported by air mode.
9) Can be stacked six high.
INTSRMODAL CONTAINER
1) Efficient load-unload cycle in civilian market.
2) Inefficient load-unload cycle in DOD with present
equipment.
3) Is not subject to significant pilferage or breakage
of material.
^) Is very weight efficient.
5) Has a high price tag.
6) Has an efficient packing density.
7) Has a good cube utilization.
8) Is fully interraodal.
9) Provides for direct supplier to customer service.
10) Is more corrosion resistant than the MILVAN.
11) Presently the state of the art.
12) Has a much faster delivery time than other methods.
13) Can only be stacked two high.
C. CONCLUSION
Based on some of the observations made, there appears
to be a need to provide a faster and more reliable means
of material movement between consignor and consignee. This
can be affected through the use of intermodal containers;
however, the cost of rapid change to interraodal containers




Nevertheless, the need does exist, and as cargo shipments
become larger, and the anticipated response time is decreased
to be effective in responding to conflicts, some commonality
must be established. As early as 1976, a joint Department
of Defense (DOD) -Department of Transportation (DOT) study
in concert with commercial industries came to some rather
interesting conclusions:
1) There is a need at present for an integrated
surface-air transportation system that can
accommodate mass movements of freight by air.
2) The catalyst to bring this about is a family of
unit load devices (trailers or containers) that
are not captive to any one mode.
3) The concept of an integrated surface-to-air
system is operationally practical.
^) A common set of commercial and military require-
ments for such a system can be generated which
can be satisfied efficiently ri7:ll.
These points are not great relevations , rather; they are
the placing on paper of what exists and what must be done.
The above comments were further supported by the Project
Intact report completed in the middle of 1976. Project
Intact (Intermodal Air Cargo Test) was a joint venture by
the military and various civilian firms. The test confirmed
that intermodalism, in concept and in use by the military
and civilians, was feasible and effective in providing rapid
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movement of cargo by air, and that the two groups can, if
willing, work together towards a common logistics goal.
This further highlights the fact that it is imperative that
the government and commercial air cargo carriers coordinate
and establish a common set of guidelines, while they strive
to achieve commonality in equipment. This can be accomplished
most easily through testing and evaluating systems, and
through gaining the realization that containerization is the
most economical program in the long run.
As previously mentioned, the sea-land-rail shippers have
realized a reduction in operating costs due to containerization,
and the air industry is beginning to realize that these bene-
fits outweigh costs only in the long run, for each carrier
experiences high initial start up costs to implement these
new systems.
Overall, there exists a need to reduce handling time,
obtain a better cube utilization, and have the ability for
shipment transfer between shipping point and destination
without further break-bulk handling. Succinctly, there are
several conclusions that are readily apparent:
1) Larger airplanes do not necessarily make air
logistics more efficient. A more sophisticated packaging
and handling system is necessary for more efficient cargo
handling.
2) An effective interface must exist between the air
mode and all other modes. This interface is virtually non-
existent in the military.
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3) The military does not promote unitization; rather,
it fosters single package shipments.
^) Labor intensive handling costs have overtaken
depreciated capital intensive handling costs.
5) Peacetime military air cargo shipment requirements
will not significantly affect civilian air cargo handling
strategies.
6) The military must coordinate its packaging and
handling strategy with the civilian community.
7) A cost-benefit analysis of intermodal containers
would force the military to analyze total distribution
concepts, rather than isolated areas.
8) The '^63L system will remain in effect for some time.
For the time being, the Department of Defense will
continue to use the present break-bulk shipment methods.
Extensive use of the present system of pallets and MILVANS
,
with planned upgrading of the present system, will surely
place the military at a disadvantage in future years, if
assistance is solicited from the commercial sector through
GRAF.
The military logistics system is operating without state
of the art technology, and until new compatible systems are
slowly phased in to the military logistics framework, DOD
will be at a disadvantage in transporting massive amounts of
cargo by air during times of crisis, in a timely fashion.
Moreover, our ability to mobilize the commercial cargo
market for military use will be extremely hampered. Improved
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coordination must be achieved to secure systems that will







Due to the broad nature of the subject matter, and time
constraints placed on the research towards this thesis, all
of the subjects were not covered in detail. Further, the
possible data available to the author were most likely not
included due to these constraints. The author, therefore,
recommends that further study be conducted in the field of
air containerization, and that the specific items listed
below should be given the utmost attention.
1) An in-depth cost analysis must be accomplished,
integrating civilian-military needs, to provide sound
financial information.
2) An analysis of future container needs, and support
needs, must be conducted in harmony with the civilian
community.
3) Attempts should be made to compare effectiveness
of intermodality in relation to pallet -MILVAN air shipments
^) Throughput analysis must be done on a comparative
basis, with consideration given to bulk of shipment, type,
unit load configuration, priority, storage locations and
administrative lead time.
5) Efforts should be made to provide standardization




In the final analysis, todays sophistication demands
cooperation, thought reaction and interplay of ideas. To
do less is to achieve less. Only through a cooperative
effort by all members of DOD and the civilian air cargo
community can we hope to have the necessary logistics arm
to support a rapidly developing scenario. The air container
is the medium by which a compatible and responsive air cargo
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Title ; 25K Transporter Loader
Item Description ; This item has the capacity to transport
25.000 pound palletized loads to and from military cargo
aircraft. It has a platform length of 24 feet, width 10 feet
with a lifting range of 3 I/3 feet to I3 feet at 10 PPM and
accommodates three ^631 pallets.
Program Plan ; Available at all aerial ports.
Source; Container System Hardware Status Report,
Army Container Oriented Distribution System,




Title ; ^OK Transporter Loader
Item Description ; This item has the capacity to transport
^0,000 pound palletized loads to and from military cargo
aircraft. It has a platform length of 41 1/2 feet, v/idth 10
feet with a lifting range of 3 1/3 feet to 13 feet at 10 ?PM
and accommodates five h-o^L pallets.
Program Plan : Available at all aerial ports.
Source: Container System Hardware Status Report,
Army Container Oriented Distribution System,









Title ; ^,000 pound Capacity Low Mast Forklift Truck
Item Description ; This item will provide air bases capability
for loading/unloading 8 foot wide by 8 foot high containers.
The vehicle has a gasoline powered engine and is capable of
lifting ^,000 pounds and a 2^ inch load center. It has
collapsed mast height of 70 inches with a lift height of 1-^4
inches
.
Program Plan ; To procure low mast forklifts for Air Force
replacements of 4,000 pound trucks.
Status ; Procurement of 833 units has been programmed and
funded.
Source; Container System Hardware Status Report,
Army Container Oriented Distribution System,







Title ; ^63L Adapter Pallet for 20 Foot Containers.
Item Description : The adapter pallet provides means for
handling containers in the ^63L aircraft material handling
system. The Dallet adapts the container to military or
commercial cargo aircraft roller systems. It provides
means for interlocking with the ^63L restraint system for
palletized cargo.
Program Plan ; To procure 2,520 adapters to be prepositioned
at aerial ports and terminals to handle ISO configured
containers, vans, shelter and special equipment.
Status ; The prototypes have been procured and tested
successfully.
Source: Container System Hardware Status Report,
Army Container Oriented Distribution System,












VOLUME INSIDE ; 1060
GROSS WEIGHT; ^4^,800 Lbs
Source: Container System Hardware Status Report
Army Container Oriented Distribution System,







GROSS WEIGHT (DESIGNED): 4^,800 LBS
WIDTH: 8 FT
WEIGHT EflPTY: 5785 Lbs
Source: Container System Hardware Status Report,
Array Container Oriented Distribution System,







DOOR OPENING WIDTH; 89 IN
WIDTH: S FT
DOOR OPENING \^a , 82 IN
WEIGHT; 8500 Las
Source; Container System Hardware Status Report,
Anny Container Oriented Distribution System,





Title ; Aircraft Mobile Loader
Item Description : This item will provide lifting capability
for loading 20 foot containers and palletized cargo into Civil
Reserve Air Fleet (CRA?) wide and narrow-bodied aircraft.
The lifting height ranges from 1 1/2 feet to IS I/3 feet,
with a ^0,000 pound capacity. Platform length is 23 lA feet,
width is 10 2/3 feet, and accommodates three ^6jL pallets or
one 20 foot container.
Program Plan ; To procure 2^ mobile loaders.
Status ; 2^ mobile loaders have been programmed for funding
FY79 thru ?Y82.
Source: Container System Hardware Status Report,
Army Container Oriented Distribution System,




Title ; 67,000 pound Capacity Container Handler
Item Descrintion : This item v/ill provide the capability to
transfer 8 foot wide containers weighing up to 67,000 pounds
and -^0 foot in length from line haul trailers/trucks to ^63L
material handling equipment for loading military or commercial
cargo aircraft.
Program Flan; To procure 18 handlers for positioning at major
APOD's and APOS's.
Status: Testing of the loading capability of the LeToumeau
loader has been completed satisfactorily. Procurement is
being programmed for FY 1982 and out years.
Source: Container System Hardv/are Status Report,
Army Container Oriented Distribution System,




Title ; 35 Ton Bridge Crane
Item DescriDtion ; This item will provide the aerial ports
the capability to transfer fully loaded 20 or '^i-O foot containers
from trucks/trailers to pallets and aircraft loaders. Lift-
ing capacity is 62,000 pounds.
Program Plan : Seven cranes have been funded for installation
at COnUS ports Dover AFB, DE , and Travis AFB, CA; Europe
installations are to be at Mildenhall AB, UK, and Ramstein
A3, GE; Pacific installations are to be Clark AE, PI, Kedena
AB and Yokota AB, JP.
Status ; The cranes are installed and operational at CONUS
aerial ports. Contracts for remainder have been let and
installation is to be completed by Sept. 30.
Source: Container System Hardware Status Report,
Army Container Oriented Distribution System,





Item Description ; This item will provide an air transportable
lifting device for loading/unloading Civil Reserve Air Fleet
(CRA?) v/ide and narrovz-bodied aircraft. The lifting height
ranges from 1 3/^ feet to 18 feet with a 30fOOO pound capacity.
Platform length is 21 feet, v/idth is 10 2/3 feet, accommodates
three ^631 pallets or one 20 foot container. Assembly requires
1 1/2 hours.
Program Plan ; To procure 32 elevators.
Status ; Thirteen elevators have been procured and deployed.
Nineteen more have been programmed for funding FY79 through
?Y83.
Source; Container System Hardware Status Report,
Army Container Oriented Distribution System,
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Army Container Oriented Distribution System,
















VOLUrffi ^. OF TOT
I960 1330 594 44.73 285 21.40 .8 .058
1961 1326 586 44.38 296 22.36 1.3 .068
1962 1387 616 43.82 309 22.3 1.3 .093
1961 1469 644 ^3.65 336 22.89 1.3 .088
1964 1556 679 43.67 356 22.9 1.5 .096
1965 1651 721 ^3.33 359 21.76 1.9 .116
1966 1759 762 41.79 381 21.66 2.3 .128
1967 1776 742 41.16 389 21.88 2.6 .145
1968 1839 151 40.84 396 21.55 2.9 .157
1969 1895 774 39.83 404 21.32 3.2 .168
1970 1936 771 38.19 412 21.28 3.3 .170
1971 1953 746 37.8 445 22.78 3.5 .170
1972 2071 783 38.51 470 22.7 3.7 .179
1973 2232 858 38.52 505 22.66 3.9 .175
197^ 2212 852 36.39 495 22.38 3.9 .180
197
'^
2080 757 488 23.46 3.7 .192
1975 Railroad '^ OF TOTAL not available
Inland 'Waterways, Oil Pipelines Deleted
Source: Statistical Abstracts of the United States,
U.S. Department of Commerce,





5UV.: >RY 0^ TC;JNAGE MOVED B"'














FY 72 FV 73 FV 74 FV 75 FV 76 FV7T FY 77 FV78
516998 451142 290947 273324 265258 58223 271358 2acE49
101733 59545 64514 78107 5737S 11437 96644 32609
1 Pisc3i ^^an I
2. rjcai vear 7
3. Sues^Queni
'
FY 68 76 ^tmnf. from 1 Juiv of Th« year creviaus lo 30 Jun« of in« nominal year. In oth«r vvorcn PY 68 lurred I July 1967 and dnded 30 Jun« 1968.
r ^r.t ifom 1 Juiv 1375 :3 30 Seo 76.
icat »ean go trom 1 Oct of -na >«' or»v.ou< to 30 Sep of irte rtommjl yeai- In other *vords FV 7g itarted 1 Oa 1977 and arded 30 S*p 1978.
4. "C^'annai" <s noTnaJ aenai [X)n traffic movwd ttirauqn tc*i»duied mijsiooi.
3. 3o«Ciai Aisignrrent Mirlift V<siions are i^on-tc^^OLled miss-ont ooerattd at t^a request ot CQO oeoanr'
VARY OF = 'SiZriGERi .VOVID
"ARY A-,\L:fT CGMMA.ND : •^!l-\
FY 68 FV 69 FY 70 FY 71 FY 72 FY 73 FY 74 FY 75 FV 76 FV 7T FY 77 FV 73
Ch*in«t 'man^an 27CX1266 2920438 2830614 2546093 1906802 1411211 1137696 1091546 1048413 290330 1062593 991463
Soacui Asjgnmartt 365826 355091 304485 32512 107624 174473 110437 213064 141927 23843 136620 270078
A.n.ft MaMoni
OOO 5oaca AvstUbla 277536 335984 372324 3S9977 336229 309832 282254 309140 2493S9 S99S2 243653 290609
Taai »4362« 3S11S11 1567823 2988387 2350655 1835S1S 1530387 1613750 1439704 369125 149 7366 1S521S5
WW^^WVS^^SA^SA<»^^A^^^^^^^ '*'''*^*****»'**^'^»'*^'*<'*«'*"^'*«'^^ *>^*>f9 'm VS>^»Sl^l»^»%^P*»S>VVS'^'VVVS'MVSW»*^V»^^V^i*^'ViwN^'w*wN»*»*w*»^^
Source: Military Airlift Command
. Defense Transportation




SHIPMENTS FROM TRAVIS AIR FORCE BASE
MONTH OF APRIL 1979
DESTINATION HIGH PRIORITY REGULAR SHIPMENT TOTAL
# OF -rr' OF # OF
SHIPIVENTS TONS SHIPMENTS TONS SHIPMENTS TONS
ADAK 2 .7 2 .7
KING SALMON 2 .1 2 .1
ALICE SPRINGS 48 10.4 48 10.4
BITBURY 1 .5 1 .5
BANGKOK 2 i^.O 26 18.
3
28 22.3
CHRIST CHURCH 19 1.2 36 2.9 55 4.1
CANTON ISLAND 13 3.3 13 3.3
CLARK AFB m,i^ ^0.5 9^0 141.8 1068 182.
5
CUBI POINT 596 85.0 1669 180.8 2376 265.9
DHAHRAN 1 .^ 1 .4
DJAKARTA 10 3.5 42 16.1 52 19.6
KADENA lOi]- 3^^.^ 132 ^9.9 237 74.3
SLMENDORF 32 16. ^' 123 24.7 156 41.1
EIELSON ^ 1.1 23 1.6 28 2.8
ENEVJETOK k6 18.8 51 17.5 98 36.3
RHSIN-r^IN 13 2.1 179 33.7 198 36.4
GUANTANAMO 1 .1 1 .1
HICHAM AFB 309 63.2 2614 263.9 29^1 327.4
HGUARD 1 .1 1 .1
I'VO JIMA 1 .1 1 ,1
JOHNSTON IS. 1 .1 18 4.0 19 4.1
KWISAN o" 4 .5 4 .5
K-'JAJATEIN 10 2.0 63 13.3 78 15.3
K'.-JAiNG JU 1 .1 1 .1
HAROLD S. HOLT ^ 1.0 67 13.9 71 14.9
MIDWAY 1 .3 17 5.2 18 5-5
MILDSNHALL 7 2^.2 8 ^.7 15 28.9
MISA^.-JA 2 2.1^ 9 1.6 11 4.0
DIEGO GARCIA 75 12.7 153 14.2 230 26.9
YOKOTA 67 22.5 205 20.7 272 43.2
OSAI^I 160 235.2 498 352.9 678 607.8
RICHMOND 1 A 39 3.6 40 4.0
RAMSTEIN ^9 28.5 197 33.8 250 62.3
SOCS TENBERG 1 .1 1 .1
SPARREVOHN 1 .1 1 .1
SHEMYA 3 .6 9 1.9 12 2.5
TAEGU 6 2.^ 24 4.8 30 7.2
TENGAU 6 .3 27 ..6 3 .9
TEr/!PELHOF 6 .3 6 .3
TAIPEI 6 .8 6 .8
GUAM 88 22.6 1364 138.8 1466 161.6
WOONEKA 2 .1 61 18.3 63 18.4
TOTALS 1,73^ 626.6 8,788 1,390.6 10.617 2,038.3
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